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Industrial-size data spills, leaks about large-scale secret surveillance pro-
grams, and personal tragedies due to inappropriate flows of information are
guaranteed to have at least one consequence: engineers will be increasingly
expected to integrate privacy solutions into the systems they are building or
maintaining (see, e.g., [1]. Yet, the task of engineering systems to address pri-
vacy concerns can be complex.
The seeming unwieldiness of the engineering task becomes evident in the
concept of privacy itself and how this concept is negotiated. As a legal con-
cept, privacy is defined rather vaguely. That vagueness, some argue, is part
of its protective function. The open ended definition allows people to invoke
privacy as a category to protect their personal lives and autonomy from intru-
sions by others – including the state that endows them with citizenship rights
and runs surveillance programs. European Data Protection Directive (DPD) or
Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) on the other hand are procedural
measures, e.g., like notice and choice, data retention limitation, subject access
rights. These principles are seen to be instrumental to making the collection
and processing activities of organizations transparent. Although less ambiguous,
data protection principles still need to be translated into technical requirements
and are vulnerable to narrow interpretations. Moreover, FIPPs fall short of
mitigating all the privacy concerns of the users’ towards a given organization.
They also do not address privacy concerns users may have with respect to other
users, with people in their social environments and towards a greater public.
Scholars from various fields have stepped up to the challenge of clearing
the murky waters of privacy. Legal scholars and philosophers have proposed
taxonomies of privacy violations [2] and a holistic framework for evaluating
appropriate flows of information based on contextual social norms [3]. Social
scientists and ethnographers have studied groups of people, online and offline, to
develop better informed understandings of users’ needs. But, how are engineers
supposed to integrate and translate these frameworks into existing engineering
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practice? It is in answering this question, privacy research conducted within
computer science is valuable.
Over the years, privacy research in computer science has led to a whole
palette of privacy solutions. The solutions originate from diverse sub-fields of
computer science, e.g., security engineering, software engineering, HCI, AI. From
a birds eye view, all of these researchers are studying privacy problems and
solutions, and yet a closer look reveals that they also have their differences. In
the following, I introduce a small taxonomy of prominent approaches to privacy
within computer science. The categories of this taxonomy are not comprehensive
or definitive, but they provide a way of distinguishing the guiding principles
of the different approaches that privacy researchers are taking. In practice,
engineers may mix and match these principles; pulling them apart allows us to
think about the different ways in which we can engineer systems with privacy
in mind.
1 Privacy as Confidentiality
The most prominent conception of privacy relies on the binary that exposure of
information leads to a loss of privacy, while guaranteeing the confidentiality of
information is a way to preserve or enhance privacy. This binary can be linked
to Warren and Brandeis’ “right to be let alone” [4], which was a response to the
novel ways in which innovation in technology makes it increasingly possible to
collect information about matters that would have previously been regarded as
private.
Many privacy researchers work on privacy solutions that rely on this binary
understanding of unwanted disclosures as privacy violations. These researchers
rely on three important principles: data minimization, avoidance of a single
point of failure and openness to scrutiny. The first principle, data minimization
is about designing systems (and computational mechanisms) to only collect
private information that is absolutely necessary for a given functionality. In
its bare bones, this means that, by default, the users should be able to use the
system anonymously. If the users have to be identified, the different interactions
of the user throughout time should remain unlinkable. For example, a user of a
service may utilize zero knowledge proofs to prove that she is above 18 without
revealing her birthdate or any further private information, thus guaranteeing
that her transactions are unlinkable. Communications as well as traffic data
must also be kept confidential from unauthorized parties, sometimes including
the service provider itself. The capabilities of these unauthorized parties, also
called adversaries, is an important driver of threat models, and hence the design
of privacy solutions in this line of research.
The second principle is to avoid designing architectures for information col-
lection and processing with a “single point of failure”. In other words, intro-
ducing a distributed trust model so that users do not need to rely on a single
entity to protect their privacy. The third principle requires that the protocols,
code and processes of development that underlie the privacy tools are open to
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public scrutiny in order to increase trust in the privacy solution itself. Tor here
is a popular example of privacy as confidentiality solution that is built using all
three principles.
2 Privacy as Control
Another approach to privacy starts from the assumption that information will
have to be disclosed in an increasingly networked world. Hence, Westin writes,
privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for them-
selves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated
to others [5]. Westins work, which he further butressed with dozens of large-scale
surveys, is fundamental to most legal and organizational measures introduced
to protect personal data across the globe.
Based on this conception of information privacy, DPD and FIPPs list pro-
cedural mechanisms through which organizations can make their personal data
collection and processing practices transparent to their data subjects, regulators
and the general public. If these mechanisms are in place, ideally users can make
informed decisions about and have greater control over the collection and flows
of their personal information. Further, abuses can be detected or mitigated.
A good portion of privacy research focuses on developing methods and mech-
anisms for data protection compliance. These protection mechanisms are ex-
pected to compliment organizational measures, like privacy training for employ-
ees working with personal data or procedures for database breach notifications.
Another type of notification is the privacy policy, through which organizations
can inform data subjects about the purpose for which they are collecting per-
sonal data, which data, and for how long. Privacy researchers have studied
ways in which to ease the burden of reading privacy policies often weighted
with legal jargon. Proposals have included usable representations of the con-
tent through labeling mechanisms comparable to those in the food industry, as
well as the design of machine readable privacy policies that can be matched to
user preferences.
Privacy policy languages, as the latter are often called, and policy enforce-
ment mechanisms like purpose based access control models can be applied in
combination to provide organizations with mechanisms to ensure that the inter-
nal use of personal data adheres to the collection purpose. Data minimization
also pops up here, but rather than aspiring to achieve anonymity or unlinkability
through computational methods, the principle is about limiting the collection of
personal data for the given purpose only. These researchers often assume that
service providers are the main party trusted with the protection of personal
data. This means that distributed trust models are rare in these proposals.
Subject access rights, the ability of the users to access, rectify or delete their
data collected by a service provider is another challenging requirement which
has attracted research and has found popular implementations like Google dash-
board.
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3 Privacy as Practice
In this third approach, privacy is seen as the negotiation of social boundaries
through a set of actions that users collectively or individually take with respect
to disclosure, identity and temporality in environments that are mediated by
technology. Hence, privacy is not seen as something that users can delegate
to the machine. Rather, engineers explore how design mechanisms and princi-
ples mediate users’ privacy practices [6]. These researchers dispense with the
binary understanding of privacy as exposure and privacy as concealment, since
interactions inform negotiation of privacy in unexpected ways, e.g., a user may
signal to her peers through chat that she wants to be left alone, a disclosure
that allows her to negotiate her privacy in a public space. As evident in this
example, the distinction between online and offline privacy is also undone in the
pursuit of understanding privacy practices.
Privacy researchers here emphasize that privacy is negotiated through col-
lective dynamics, e.g., if unlucky, the same user might have very disrespectful
peers that do not respect her request for privacy. Transparency and feedback
mechanisms for raising awareness of the socio-technical systems workings are
often proposed as central to establishing privacy practices. This understand-
ing of transparency is greater than providing information about what data is
collected by an organization as proposed in privacy as control. Instead, the
objective is to make information systems, their affects, as well as the responses
from (non-)user communities part of what needs to be made transparent.
For example, if possible consequences of a user’s actions can be made trans-
parent to her, she may be able to make better decisions about her interactions.
The user may learn from her past interactions, so feedback on past practices
may be used to inform future ones. For instance, information about how many
friends have visited a user’s profile may inform how much she wants to post
on her profile in the future. Similarly, users may learn from their (mediated)
social surroundings: information about how other friends manage their privacy
settings may provide guidance to the user. In some cases, based on studies
about good privacy norms, users can be nudged to develop better privacy prac-
tices [7], e.g., users may be opportunistically encouraged to review their privacy
settings. Similarly, if a user is provided with feedback on the algorithms under-
lying a recommender system, she may better assess whether and how she wants
to participate in such a system.
4 Future prospects
There are many more proposals for addressing privacy in systems than listed
above. Some proposals fall in-between the three categories. For example,
database anonymization and differential privacy both propose elaborate com-
putational methods for data minimization comparable to solutions in privacy
as confidentiality. However, the mechanisms are not intended to minimize data
collection but to anonymize or obfuscate later disclosure. Further, database
4
anonymization is a way to exit the legal compliance regime, making it difficult
to identify it as an organizational transparency mechanism typical of privacy
as control. Furthermore, there are a number of proposals for addressing dis-
crimination and fairness issues in the context of data mining like discrimination
aware data mining as well as fairness in classification. However, it is open to
discussion whether discrimination and fairness are privacy issues. Generally,
many concerns we discuss under privacy may in fact be related to greater issues
of social justice that require more elaborate rethinking of our societies as well
as technological futures.
The taxonomy above shows that engineering decisions, be it when archi-
tecting infrastructures, designing organizational systems or crafting particular
applications, co-determine the way in which people may negotiate their privacy.
Yet, challenges are abound. Can we integrate these three approaches given their
fundamental differences? For example, while privacy as confidentiality assumes
a world in which trust in organizations that process private data should be
minimized, privacy as control assumes trust in those organizations can be es-
tablished through transparency. In contrast, most privacy as practice proposals
assume that the service provider is honest and has a genuine interest in ac-
commodating users’ privacy practices above its own organizational and market
interests. Hence, a skeptic could ask, given the slipperiness of the concept, the
political and market contestations of privacy, as well as the differences between
the solution sets, can we even speak of a privacy engineering project?
Engineering privacy may in fact only be another ideal like engineering se-
curity, dependability, or usability, and one that misleadingly suggests that we
can engineer social and legal concepts. We cannot engineer society, but neither
are our societies independent of the systems we engineer. Hence, as practition-
ers and researchers we have the responsibility to engineer systems that address
privacy concerns. The above taxonomy attempts to provide an overview of ex-
isting approaches to privacy in computer science research. The robustness of
these approaches will only grow through further engagement in all of them when
we engineer systems.
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